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In this regard the new Act provides-
(aJ a trade union representing employees of the company may take 
proceedings to restrain the company from acting ultra vires or doing 
anything inconsistent with the new Act;56 
(bj if the board of a company adopts a resolution in favour of granting 
financial assistance in tenns of s 45 such cOlnpany must provide 
written notice of that resolution to, inter alia) any trade union 
representing the company's elnployees;S7 
(cJ a registered trade union or another representative of employees may 
apply to court for an order declaring a director delinquent or under 
probation in the circumstances provided by the statute;58 
(d) the new Act abolishes the common-law derivative action and 
substitutes for it a statutory derivative action. As regards locus standi CO 
b ring the statutory derivative action only the persons specified in the 
statute will have the right to serve a demand on a company or to 
continue legal proceedings or to take related steps to protect the 
interes ts of the company. A registered trade union that represents the 
employees of the company or another representative of employees is 
given locus standi to bring the statutory derivative action;59 
(eJ employees are included with those persons who have whistle-
blower protection.6o 
Employees are given extensive protections and fights of participation 
in business rescue proceedings. 6 1 
X CONC LUSION 
The new Act has yet to come into operation. 62 When it does so its 
practical application will be tested and it may confidently be predicted 
that its interpretation will be the subject matter of complex litigation . This 
is to be expected from ground-breaking legislation which will have such 
an important impact on the commercial environment in South Africa. 
The legislation is world-class and places South Africa at the forefront of 
corporate law reform. Exciting times are ahead. 
Sf> Section 20(4) of the ncw Act. 
:;7 Section 45(5) of rbe new Act. 
SK Section 162(2) of the new Act. 
5') Section 165(2)(c) of the new Act. 
w Section 159 of the new Act. 
101 See ch 6 of the new Act ('Busjnes~ Resclle ;lOd Compromise with Credi tors} 
(,2 Sec above (n 1). 
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A comparative analysis of directors) duty of 
care) skill and diligence in South 
Africa and in Australia 
JEAN J DU PLESSIS* 
The South African and Australian law regarding directOrs' du ty of care, ski ll 
and diligence were influenced considerably by English precedcn t~ of the late 
1800s and early 19005. Originally both jurisdictions adopted a conservative 
approach towards directors' duty of care, skill and diligence. This resulted in 
very low standards of care, skill and diligence expected of directors. In 
Australia, the standards of care and diligence expected of directors changed 
drastically with the case of Daniels II Anderson, where obj ec tive standards were 
used to determine a breach of directors' duty of carc and diligence, and \vhen 
objective standards of care and diligence were introduced in Australian 
corporations legislation. In this article it is submitted that if the oppOt:wnity 
arose for a South African court CO consider whether a director is in breach of 
his or her common law duty of care, skill and diligence, the form of fault that 
will be requi red will be negligence as j udged agaitlSt the standards- of a 
reasonable person. This Illeans that in actual fact objective standards of care 
and diligence are expected of direccors in South Africa. Although section 76(3) 
of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not introduce purely 
objective standards of care, skill and diligence, the section is defended in this 
article. It is pointed out that encouraging emerging entrepreneurs to become 
directors of South African companies provides justification for keeping sub-
jective elements as part of the test to determine whether a director \vas in 
breach of his or her statutory duty of care, skill and diligence. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this contribution the focus is on the new statutory duty of care, skill and 
diligence contained in s 76(3) of the recently adopted South African 
Companies Act 71 of2008 (the Act). The provision is viewed fr0111 the 
perspective of Australian law. Such a cOTIlparative approach seelns to be 
particularly relevant as s 5(2) of the Act provides that, ' [tJo the extent 
appropriate, a court interpreting o r applying this Act may consider foreign 
company law'. This is complimentary to s 5(1), which directs that the Act 
'must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to the 
* Professor of Law (Deakin University, Auscralia), BPrec LLll LLM LLD (UOFS). I wou ld 
like to thank Gregory Lyon , SC, Barrister in criminal and commercial law at the Victorian Bar 
(Crockett Chambers) and Professor LOllis de Koker, Professor of La:w, Deakin University, for 
their useful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wllnt to thank Frank Ponte, the 
Deakin Law Librarian, for bis excellent and speedy assistance in identifying the leading 
Australian academic articles in the research fIeld of this article for me. 
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purpose of section 7'. In s 7 (e) it is provided that one of the purposes of the 
Act is to 'continue to provide for the creation and use of companies. in a 
Inanner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa as a partner 
within the global economy'. 
Very closely related to directors' duty of care, skill and diligence, is the 
so-called 'business judgment rule', or, as it is sometimes called, the 
'safe-harbour provisions' for directors. It was considered seriously to also 
include a discussion of the business judgment rule and the wider (wider 
than just for 'business judgments') protection fo r directors under s 76(4) 
of the Act. That will, however, have to wait for another day as the 
literature on the business judgment rule is vast and there are many 
diverging views 011, not only the nature and scope of the protection of a 
'businessj udgment rule', but also whether or not such a rule, or any wider 
form of protection for directors, should form part of a modern Companies 
Act. 
II THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
(1) Di,utO,S' common-law duty of care, skill and diligence 
The leading South African work< on corporate law and rurectors' duties 
deal with directors' duty of care, skill and diligence under slightly different 
headings. However, it is fair to say that although South African commen-
tators use different headings to discuss this duty, there is in actual fact little 
difference among the South African commentators when it comes to how 
they explain the substance of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence.' 
Based on the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen, 2 which was in turn influenced by the English cases of In re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estates Ltd3 and In re City Equitable Fi .. 
Insurance Co Ltd,' Cilliers et al identify the following principles: 
(a) The extent of a director's duty of care and skiU depends to a 
considerable degree on the nature of the company's business and on 
any particular obligations assumed by or assigned to him. There is a 
I Sec and compare HS Cilliers I!l af CiIlit!T5 & Benade: Corporatt: LAw 3 cd (2000) 147 para 
iO.30-1 0.32; D Galgut et af Hel10clJsberg onihe Companies Act: ~lume 2 Loose LeafS ed (1994-
updated until June 2008 - Service Issue 27) 462;JT Pretorius et 21 Hahfo~ Soulh Afn·aH! Company 
Law dlmf4gh the Cases - A Source Br1Ok6 ed (1 999) 280-284; MS Blackman 'Companies' LA WSA 
vol 4:2 (1996) 232-3 para 1.38; RC 13cuthin and SM Luiz Beuthin's Basic O)lnpallY Law 2 cd 
(1992) 228; S] N;mde Die Regsposi.(ie !Ian die Maatskappydirektcur met Besondere Jlerwysirrg no die 
httcrnc MaalskapPYflcrhalid (LLD Thesis University ofSourh Africa 1969) 215; JL van Domen 
Rights, Powers and Dulies oJDirCC!ors (1992) 170 and 172. 
2 1930 (4) SA 156 CW) at 165. Cf JJ du Plessis Maatskappyregte1ike Grondsiae (LLD Thcsj~ 
Universiry of the Orange Free State 1991) 80-3; R Brusscr 'The Role and Liability of 
Non~executive Directors' 1983 South African Company LJ 12. 
'[19 11] 1 Ch425. 
4 [1925J 1 eh 407. 
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difference between the full-time or executive director, who partici-
pates in the day to day management of the company's affairs and the 
non-executive director who has not undertaken any special obliga-
tion. The latter is not bound to give continuous attention to the 
affairs of the company. His duties are of an intennittent nature. to be 
performed at periodical board meetings and at any other meetings 
which may require his attention. He is not, hov,lever, bound to 
attend all such meetings, though he ought to whenever he is 
reasonably able to do so. 
(b) A director is not required to have special business aC11men or 
expertise, or singular ability or intelligence or even experience in the 
business of the company. He is, however, expected to exercise the 
care which can reasonably be expected of a person with his knowl-
edge and experience. A director is not liable for mere errors of 
judgment. 
(c) In respect of all duties that may properly be left to some other 
official, a director is, in the absence of specific grounds for suspicion, 
j ustified in trusting that official to perfoml such duties honestly. He is 
entitled to accept and rely on the judgment, information and advice 
of the management, unless there are proper reasons for questi<?A.fng 
such. Obviously, a director exercising reasonable cafe woufd not 
accept information and advice blindly. He would accept it, and he 
would be entitled to rely on it, but he would give it due consider-
ation and exercise his own judgment accordingly. 5 
This rather long quotation has been included to illustrate, as will be 
seen later, how sixnilar the South African and Australian COTnmon law 1n 
the area of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence was until about 1992. 
Since the Fisheries Development Corporation case , there were only a few 
other South African cases where directors' duties of care, skill and 
diligence were mentioned. By no means did these cases move the South 
African common law, as far as directors' duty of care, skill and diligence is 
concerned, strides ahead as was the case in Australia with the landmark 
decision of Daniels 1/ Andcrson6 in 1995. 7 
(2) Directors' duty ojcare, skill and diligence in terms ojs 76(3) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(a) 77" statu tor), du/.y and 5 4} of Close COlporations Act 69 qf 1984 
It is appropriate to commence the discussion of s 76(3) of the Act with a 
reference to s 43 of the South African Close Corporations Act 69 of1984 
5 Cilliers (0 1) 147-8 paras 10.30- 10.31. CfBeutbin and Luiz (n 1) 228- 9. 
<, 16ACSR 607 (CA (NSW}). 
7 See Part III (1) below. 
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(Close Corporations Act, 1984). T he reason is that s 43 is probably the 
best illustration of how directors' duty of care, skill and diligence is 
perceived under the Sou th African common law. Although .I 43 deals 
with the duty of care and skill of members of close corporations. it was indeed 
an attempt to codify the duties of members of close corporations, based 
primarily on the common-law duties expected cif cOl11pany directors. Sectio n 43 
reads as fo llows: 
43 Liability of m embers for negligence 
(1) A member of a corporation shall be liable to the corporation for loss 
caused by his failure in the carrying on of the business of the corporation to act 
with the degree of care and skill that may reasonably be expected from a 
person of his knowledge and experience. 
(2) Liability [eferred to in subsection (1) shall not be incurred jf the relevant 
conduct was preceded or followed by the written approval of all the members 
where sllch members were or are cognisant of all the material faces. 
Company law cases are indeed used in interpreting the standards 
expected of members of close corporations under .I 43 8 
Al though there were long discussions, and directors ' statutory duties 
formulated in different ways in several initial drafts of the Act, s 76 of the 
Act is the current article dealing w ith directors' statutory duties: 
76. (1) In this section, 'directo r ' includes an alternate director, and -
(a) a prescribed officer; or 
(b) a person who is a member of a committee of a board of a company, or of 
the audit committee of a company, irrespective of ,'vhether or not the 
person is also a member of the company's board. 
(2) A director of a company must -
(a) not use the position ofdjrcctor, or any information obtained w'hile ac ting 
in the capacity of a directOr-
(i) to gain. an advantage fo r the director, or for another person other 
than' the company or a wholly o\vned subsidiary of the company; or 
(ii) to knowingly cause ha rm to the company or a subsidiary of the 
company; and 
(b) communicate to the board at the earl iest practicable opportunity any 
informa tion that comes to the director's attention, unless the director-
(i) reasonably believes that the information is -
(aa) immaterial to the company; or 
(bb) generally available to the public, or known to the other 
direc tors; or 
(ii) is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical 
obiiga tion of conftdentiality. 
1\ Sec and compare Galgut (n 1) vol 3, Com- l11 para 43.2 and ME. Denade e( (1[ 
ElllreprcneuritJi LAw 4 cd (2008) 325 par:l:S 28.05-28.0i, 
I 
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(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, ""hen acting 
in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of 
director -
(aJ in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best in terests ofche company; and 
(ej with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be 
expected of a person -
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience ofrhae di rector. 
'Prescribed officer' is defined as 'the holder of an office, within a 
company, that has been designated by the Minister in tenm of section 
66(11)'. It will be dearthat in terms ofs 76(1)(b) even non-directors. who 
serve on board committees, are brought within the zlInbit of the statutory 
duties contained in .I 76(2) and (3). 
Section 76(2) (a)(i) contains the duties that are normally describe as 
directors' fiduciaty duties to prevent a confl ict of h is duty to the company 
and his personal interests, as well as the general principles expressed in 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver" that a director may not misuse his position 
as di rector or misuse information obtained in his capacity as di rectors, for 
instance compete with the company (corporate opportunities) or use 
inside infonnation to gain a personal advantage or an advantage for any 
other party or persoll. It was thought appropriate to ensure that this 
restrictive duty should not, in a very technical sense, deter the director to 
seek advantages for his or her own conlpany, thus the inclusion of the 
words 'other than the company' in s 76(2) (a)(i). Another qualification is 
made, namely \vhere the director uses his position or any infomution 
obtained while acting in the capacity of a director 'to gain an advantage 
for ... a wholly owned subsidiary of the company'. In otherj urisdictions, 
this exception is normaJly lllore restricted. ,0 
(b) General noteworthy aspects regarding 5 76(3)(c) - directors' duty of 'care, skill 
and diligence' 
It is s 76(3)(cj that deals with directors ' duty of care skill and diligence. 
There are several qui te interesting aspects about s 76(3) (c) that should be 
'[1 94211 All ER 378 (HL). 
10 See, for instance, s 187 of the Australian CorpQrationsAct 2001: 
'Directors of wholly-ow n e d subsidiaries 
A director of a corporation that is a \\lholly-owncd subsidiary of a body corporate l~ taken 
to act in good faith in the best interests oftbe subsidiary if: 
(a) the constitution of the subsidiary expressly authorises the d irector to act in the best 
interests of tile holding company; and 
(b) the director acts in good f.1i th in the best interests of the holding com pany; ar1d 
(c) the subsidiary is not insolvent at the time the director acts and docs nOl become 
insolvent because of the director's act.' 
268 MODERN COMPAl\I"Y LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
noted. A few general comments will firs t be made, before the focus turns 
in particular to standards of care , skill and diligence still contained in 
s 76(3). As far as general noteworthy aspects are concerned, firs t, it should 
be noted that the word 'diligence' , hardly ever used by South African 
commentators or South African courts, are also included in s 76(3) (c). 
There is little doubt that th is has been derived from the Australian 
legislation - s 180(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
Secondly, and linked to th e previous point, the standards expected of 
directors are not standards of 'care and diligence' only (it will be accepted 
that the 'care and diligence' should be seen as a term, rather than trying to 
distinguish between 'care' and 'diligence', it also includes a standard of 
"kill'. T he 'skills' part of this duty was removed in Australia from tlhe 
moment that this duty was expressed in a statutory provision by 1958 .11 
However, there were suggestions by the then Attorney-General's D epart-
ment that a list of more specific criteria regarding skills should be included 
to give some guidance to courts as to how to apply a general statement of 
the duty to the vastly differing circumstances of individual directOrs.12 
Macfarlan suggested in no uncertain terms that a fe-statem ent of directors' 
duty of care, should include references to 'skill and diligence'. He 
suggested tha< the dury should be restated as follows: 
In the exercise of his powers and the discharge of his duties, a director shall at 
all times exercise the degree of care, ski ll and diligence that a reasonable man 
who had such training and experience as the director has \\I-Q uId exercise as a 
director of the company, provided that the degree of care, skill and diligence 
that the director is required to exercise shall not be less than which would be 
exercised by a person of reasonable competence and experience. 13 
Thirdly, s 76(3) links the duty of care, skill and diligence to situations 
where directors act 'in the capacity of direct?r' and w hen it is required 
that he or she 'must exercise the powers and perform the fu nctions of 
director'. It is most likely that directors will in future try to argue that for 
whatever breach they are sued under s 76(3), they did not act in that 
capacity or exercising the powers or performed the functions of direltor 
when the alleged breach occurred. Also, because s 76 also applies to what 
has traditionally been dealt with under directors' fiduciary duties under 
South African law (see s 76(3) (a) and (b)) , it could be expected that in 
fu ture th is section will be interpreted in context of the moot point 
whether or not directors only owe their duties to the company when 
II Sec Darl;c/s 1.1 Anderson (n 6) at 660. 
12 RES Macfarlan 'Directors' Duties after the National Safety Council case: Directors' Duty 
ofean:' (1 992) 3 Auslrnliall Bar Revicw 269 at 274. 
I.' Ibid 276. For some general commems and suggestions regarding the omission of'skill' in 
the Australian legisb.tion, sec P Redmond 'The kcfonn of Directors' Duties' (1992) 15 
liNSW1..j 86 at l09and 11 1. 
• 
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acting 'as agents'. " Fourthly, s 76(3)(c)(ii) deviates from the wording used 
by Sourh Mrican and English courts by using the words 'general knowl-
edge' rather than just 'knowledge'. It is not clear what the aims are to 
include 'general' , except for trying to give it a nlore objective flavour. 
Five, some element of objective standard of revie\v is contained in 
s 76(3)(c)(i) by judging a breach against the standards of a person 'carrying 
o ut the same functio ns in relation to the company as those carried out by 
that director' . 
(c) Subjective elements of, 76(3)(cj 
The most noticeable aspect of s 76(3)(c) is probably that it did not 
objectifY di rectors' duty of care, skill and diligence completely. The 
degree of care, skill and diligence that is expected of directors under this 
article is not that of a 'reasonable person', bu t what could 'reasonably 
expected of a person .. . hailing the general knowledge, skill and experience ~f 
that director' (emphasis added). It will be recalled that the common-law 
requirement was that a director should 'exercise the care whid1 can reasonably 
be expected of a person with. his knowlecl,.e.e an.d experiellce' (emphasis added).l:> 
T hat requirement is also captured in s 43(1) of the Close Corporations 
Act, 1984 - 'the degree of care and skill that may reasonably be expected 
from a person of his knowledge and experience' (emphasis added). Section 
76(3) (c) of the Act is, therefore, clearly on a different path than s 180(1) of 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001, but let us consider the implications 
of this. 
It is submitted that nothing should be made of the fact that the words 
<reasonable person' are not used, but 'reasonably be expected of a person' , 
except that s 76(3) (c)(ii) introduces subjective elements, making it impos-
sible to have used the 'reasonable person' concept in that subsection. It is 
further submitted that basicaJiy this arti cle provides that there is a 
reasonable expectation that directors should act with the 'general knov\~I­
edge, skill and experience' of persons with con1parabJe <general kn o\vl-
edge, skill and experience'. In otller words, although at fi rst glance it 
seems silly to expect a person to act differently than \:vhat one would 
expect of him or her (taking into consideratio n his or her 'general 
knowledge, skill and e),:perience'), there is a very useful aim in the way the 
section was drafted. T he standard of care, skill and diligence of a South 
African director will indeed not be reviewed completely objectively, but 
the court will first have to determine w hat the expectations are of 
directors 'carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
14 Sec $i[,t>x COtHtrucliof1 (SA) (PI}') Lid II it!icaascal CC 1988 (2} SA 54 (T) at MF r;S t: .In·. i 
66J- 67 A; Arias Organic Fcrlili;;::CY$ (p1}'j Ltd ~. PikkcwylZ GJUl1al/O (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA ! -i .) \."J") .It 
198 D-199C; Rob;IlSQt/ II Ram!fomein Esca!(.' G(lid Mining Co l.1d i921 AD 168a1216. 
is Fishen'es Dcvelopmcnt Corporaliml of SA Ltd J/Ja~(!.cnJ(!n (11 2) at 166A-B . 
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those carried out by that director (director whose conduct is scrutinised)' 
(s 76(3)(,)(i)). Then, the court will also have to make a value judgment as 
to how other directors, with 'the gen eral knowledge, skill and experience 
of that director (director whose conduct is scrutinised), (s 76(3) (,)(ii)), 
would have conducted themselves. Thus, the intention of the Legislature 
is simply to ensure that apples are compared with apples and, putting all 
the apples, as far as that is theoretically possible, in the same hypothetical 
situation comparable to the facts of the particular case! 
111 THEAUSTRALIANLAW 
(1) Directors' common-law duties and duties in equity 
As mentioned above, the way in which the South African courts per-
ceived directors' duty of care, skill and diligence accords roughly with the 
prevailing views in Australia up to about 1992. T his statement is based on 
the comments made by R ogers CJ in the 1992 case of A WA v Daniels16 In 
dealing wi th the duty of care and diligence of non-execu tive directors, 
Rogers C] made several statements which were clearly influenced by 
English precedents of the late 1800s and early 1900s.17 It is unnecessary to 
analyse these statements in detail, because they caused the Court of 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales considerable concern, 
requi ring them to paraphrase what Rogers C] said in AWA v Daniels. For 
current purposes, and for purposes of comparing the state of the law 
regarding di rectors' duty of cares skill and diligence in South Africa and 
Australia, it is appropriate to include this rather ]ong quote from Daniels v 
A Hderson: 18 
A matter of particular significance in these appeals is the extent to which 
directors are justified in trusting and relying upon officers of the company. 
Rogers J said that a director is justified in trusting such officers to perform all 
duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business, the intelligent 
devolution of labour and the articles of association, may properly be left to 
them. He said that a director is enti tled to rely without verification on the 
judgment, information and advice of the officers so entrusted and on manage-
ment to go through relevant financial and other information of the corpora-
tion and draw to the board's attention any matter requi ring thei r consider-
ation. The business of a corporation could not go on if directors could not trust 
those who are put into a position of trust for the express purpose of attending 
to details of managemen t. Reliance would only be unreasonable where the 
director was aware of circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest 
and so simple of appreciation that no person, with any degree of prudence. 
", (1992) 7 ACSR 759. 
17 AWA v Daniels at 864 ec seq, 869 ec seq. 
11\ Daniels v Anderson (n 6). 
I 
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acting on his behalf, .... vould have relied on the particular judgment, informa-
tion and advice of the officers. A non-executive director doc.,,> not have to turn 
him or herself into an audi tor, managing director, chairman or other officer to 
find out whether management is deceiving him or her. These are the words 
uttered in 1872 by Lord Hatherly LC in Oilerend & Gllmey Co il Gibb (1 872) 
LR 5 HL 480 at 487 in describing cra~sa negligentia. 
These sentiments of Rogers CJ were then rej ected by the court in 
Daniels v Anderson, \vhich stated in no uncertain ternlS tha t in the court's 
'respectful opinion it does not accurately state the extent of the duty of 
directors whether non-executive or not in modern company law.' 19 This 
rej ection by the C ourt of Appeal provides an excelient opportunity to 
discuss the case of Daniels v Anderson in greater detail. 
It is no overstatement to say that Daniels II Anderson represents the 
pinnacle in Australia (and probably also in other jurisdictions influenced 
by English law!) of the development of directors' duty of care, ski ll and 
diligence, which started to emerge in greater detail in about 1869 with the 
English case of Turquand v Mad,all. 20 
D aniels v Anderson is rather difficul t to digest without a good under-
standing of some of the unique features of Australian law. As opposed to 
South African law, where the distinction between common-law remedies 
and equitable renledies are insignificant, this distinction stm plays an 
important role in Australian law. 21 What South African conlmentators 
will simply call directors' common-law duties (the duty of care and skill as 
well as directors' fiduciary duties), will be divided into common-law 
duties (the duty of care and diligence) and duties in equity (fiduciary 
duties). This distinction is still pronlinent in the Australian C orporations 
Act 2001. 22 It is also a distinction that Australian C0l11111entators accentu-
ate. For instance, in the opening sentence in an article on directors' duty 
of care, Macfarlan in 1992 states that the 'duty of directors to act in the 
best interests of the company has been the subj ect of much j udicial and 
academic consideration in the last few years'. He then observes as fo llows: 
19 Daniels I,Arldcrsan (n 6) at 665. 
20 (1869) LR 4 eh App 376. Before this, the general 'duty of care, ski n and diligcncc· 
expected of offtce-bearcrs will probabiy have to be traced back through thc law of parmerships 
.and the law oftwsts or even municipal boroughs. trade guilds ;md Illerch:mts' assoc14ItiOIlS. 
21 RP Austin and 1M Ram$.lY Ford~{ Principb of Carpara/iam LaUl1 3 cd (2007) 398-402 para 
8.320. 
22 For instance, lhe term 'general law· is defincd ::IS '~he prinCiples and rules of the wm»Wfl !tl!ll 
and equity'; and in 51 32(2) it is provided chat '[dJespitc any rule of law or equity ..... A~ far;ls 
directors' duties in particular are concerned, the distinction is prominent. Section 180(2). 
containing tbe so-called 'business judgmcnt rulc', provides that '{a) director or other offIcer of (I 
corporation \vho makes a business judgment is taken to meet the requirements of subsection 
(1) . and their equivalefll dUlies ac common laUl and in equicy, in re~pect of the judgment If they . . " 
and in the concluding sentence to s 185 it j$ provided th.a! s 185 'does not apply (0 5ubsecciollS 
180(2) and (3) to the extent to \\.-hich they opera te on the durie.1 at common law alld in equ.iry that 
are equjvalent to the requirements of sub$ectiOIl 180(1 r (cmphasc$ added). 
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A duty to take care arises out of the fiduciary nature of a director's office. It has 
not yet (19921) been resolved whether a common-law duty of care exists. 
Recent dcvelopments in that area, however, suggest that there is a strong 
argument that it does ... but the point is unlikely to become of importance as, 
in general liabilities of to which fiduciaries are subjected are more stringent 
than those imposed by the common law .... 23 
Little could Macfarlan know how important that point would become 
a few years later - in 1995! In fact, a very important part of Daniels v 
Andcrson2 '1 deals with the liability of directors for negligence and, in 
particular, the consequences of the fact that the cause of action in that case 
was not based on a breach of any equitable or fiduciary dury, but a claim 
for common-law damages, in particular the tort of negligence. 
There are several very technical aspects dealt with in the case, but in 
essence the Dujority (hereafter referred to as 'the court')25 of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales held that the general law relating to the tort of 
negligence was an appropriate basis for the claim of common-law 
damages against negligent directors. This is probably the most important 
and also unique part of the case, as there has never been any other case in 
any other traditional common-law jurisdiction "\vhere the tort of negli-
gence has been identified so prominently as the basis of liabiliry for 
directors in breach of their duty of care, skill and diligence. It is worth 
quoting all the parts where the court identifIed the tort of negligence as 
the basis of directors' dury of care, skill and diligence, or, as it should 
probably be referred to now, to determine whether a director owed a 
dury of care and whether that dury was breached: 
The courts have recognised that directors must be allowed to make business 
judgments and business decisions in a spirit of enterprise untrammelled by the 
concerns of conservative investment trustees. , .. Great risks may be taken in 
the hope of commel1$urate rewards. If such ventures f2"i1, how is the undertak-
ing of it to be judged against an allegation of negbgence by the entrepreneur? 
In our opinion the concept of negligence \vhich depends ultimately 'upon a 
general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which offenders must pay 
(Donohue v Stevenson [1932J AC 562 at 580) can adapt to measure appropri-
ately in the given case whether the acts or omissions of an entrepreneur are 
negligent. 26 
We arc of the opinion that a director owes to the company a duty to take 
reasonable care in the performance of the office. As the la\V of negligence has 
devcloped(,) no satisfactory policy ground survives for excluding directors 
D Macfarlan (n 12) at 269. 
2~ Danieh v AndersOIt (n 6) at 652-68. 
25 Clarke and Sheller JJA. Powell JA dissented based on his view that the more traditional 
approach should be adopted. 
26 Daniels v Anderson (n 6) at 664--5. 
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from the general requirement that they exercise reasonable care in the 
performance of their officc. A directors' fiduciary obligations do not preclude 
the common law duty of carc. 27 
The duty is a common law· duty to take reasonable carc o\'-.'cd severaily by 
persons who are fiduciary agents bound to exercise the pO\vers conferred upon 
them for private purposes or for any purpose foreign to the power and placed, 
in the words ofFord and Austin, Principles of Corporations Law, 6th cd at 429, at 
the apex of the structure of direction and management. ... Breach ofthc duty 
will found an action for negligence at the suit of the company. Negligent 
directors are tortfeasors. 28 
The court adopted the general principles of the tort of negligence and 
the duty of care after drawing the attention to three very important things. 
First, there were historic reasons why directors' duty of care, skill and 
diligence were viewed in a particular manner by the English courts of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s. Referring to the article of Hill,29 the court 
makes the following observation: 
The nature and extent of directors' liability for their acts and omissions 
developed as the body of corporate evolved from the unincorporated joiryt 
stock company regulated by a deed of settlement and v .... ·as influenced ~y the 
partnership theOlY of corporation whereunder shareholders \,vere ultilnately 
responsible for ul1\vise appointment of directors. 30 
Thus, the duties of care, skill and diligence expected of directors were 
'remarkably low ... [h]owever ridiculous and absurd the conduct of the 
directors, it was the company's mlsfortune that such ul1\vise directors 
were chosen'.31 It should, however, also be realised that apart from some 
27 Ibid 668. 
2g Ibid. 
29 J Hill 'The Liability of Passive Directors: ,'v[orlcy u Slal('wide Tobacco Services Ltd' (1992) 14 
Syd LR 504. 
30 Daniels IIAndcrson (n 6) at 657. 
.'11 Daniels II Anderson at 658-9, which is in fact a reference to what \vas said in Turqtlatld J! 
lvlarshall (1869) LR 4 eh App 376 at 386: 'It was within the po\vers of the deed to lend to a 
brother director, and however foolish the loan might have been, so long as it was \vithin the 
powers of the directors, the Court eouid not interfere and make them Eabie .... Whatever may 
have been the amount lent to anybody, however ridiculous and absurd their conduct might 
seem, it was the misfortune of the company that they chose such unwise direc[Q[s: bur as long as 
they kept within the powers of their deed, the Court could not interfere \vith the discretion 
exercised by them.', The Cooney Report Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitu-
tionalAffairs Company Directors' Dulies - Report on the Social alld Fiduciary Duties and Obligations <:f 
Company Directors (Cooney Report) (1989) at 20 para 3.3 fn 2, also cite the follo\ving cases for 
similar sentiments: Re New }\1ashonaland Exploration CO [1892J 3 Ch D 577 at 585 per Vaughan 
Williams]; Re Forest of Dean Coal Milling Co (1878) 10 Cll D 450;"lt 453 pcr]essc1 MR; Re Faure 
Electric Accumulator Co (1888) 40 Ch D 141 at 152 per Kay J. Alw see J Dodds 'Nev\"' 
Developments in Directors' Duties - The Victorian Stance on Financial Competence' (199i) 
17 Monash University Law Review 133 at 133 and 134-6. 
,'1! 
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rather unconvincing reasons tnentioned in older English cases,32 there 
were several o ther reasons why the courts were reluctant to scrutinise the 
particular acts of directors. Some of these reasons are clearly more 
convincing and morc applicable to modern commercial realities than 
others: taking up a position as non-executive director on a part-time basis 
was seen as 'an appropriate diversion for gentlemen but should not be 
coupled with onerous obligations;" 'directors are not specialists, like 
lawyers and doctors';" directors are expected to take risks and they are 
dealing with uncertainties, which would be compromised if too high 
standards of care were expected of directors; courts arc ill-equipped to 
second-guess directors' business decisions, which resulted in a rather 
ill-developed 'business judgment rule' in jurisdictions like the UK, 
Australia and South Africa; the internal management of the company is 
one that companies can arrange as they wish and courts should be 
reluctant to interfere with internal company lnatters, etc. 
The second thing the court took into consideration in embracing the 
tort of negligence as the basis ofliability for a breach of a director's duty of 
care, skill and diligence in Daniels v Anderson was that 'the law about the 
duty of directors' developed considerably since the decision in Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 3S The coun then, in roughly seven pages,36 
painstakingly guotes from modern cases before reaching tlle conclusion 
that the tort of negligence and the modern concept of a duty of care now 
forms an acceptable basis of liability for directors' breach of their duty of 
care.37 T he third thing the court mentions in Daniels v Anderson is that also 
the law of negligence has developed considerably in the seventy years 
(Daniel's case was decided in 1995) since the decision in Re City Equitable 
Fire Insurance CO. 38 
I can see no reason, in principle, based on policy or on practical 
considerations, why these three reasons should not be used by any South 
African court to accept the principles of the law of delict as the basis for 
the liability of a breach of directors' common-law duty of care, skill and 
diligence. This is so regardless of the (,ct that there are considerable 
differences in the approach the South African law of delict adopts, in 
particular as far as the elements of 'fault' and 'wrongfulness' are con-
cerned , and the approach regarding the Australian tort of negligence, in 
.'2 See Redmond (n 13) 98. 
).] Macfarlan (n 12) 269;1t 270. See al~o J Dodd$ (n 31) 134. 
3~ R edm ond (n 13) 98 quoting from Btlrnr.s !! Andrew.' 298 Fed 614 (1924) at 618. 
.'IS Op cit 661. See aL~o The Honourable Sir Douglas Menzies 'Company Directors' (1959) 33 
TnI' AUSirtliitln LAw Joumal 156;1t 156-8 and 163-4; Macfarlan (n 12) 272-3. 
J(, Daniels !! Andcrs(Jn (0 6) at 661-i. 
J7 DtlIlicls !! Andm(J11 (n 6) at 668. 
.'Ii) Daniels!! Anderson (n 6) at 661. 
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particular as far as the 'duty of care' concept is concerned.'9 As far as the 
outcomes of adopting the different approaches are concerned, I would be 
very surprised if there would be any significant difference in outcome 
between the two jurisdictions. To put it differently, I thi nk the outCome 
of Daniels v Anderson would have been exactly the same if the general 
principles of the South African law of delict were applied - although the 
approaches differ. they aim at solving the same problem and, depending 
on which approach one is more familiar with, one might prefer the one 
over the other'O Personally I find the South African law of delict to be 
more systematic and more scientific. There also seems to be, probably 
because of the clearer guidance on the elements of 'negligence' and 
'wrongfulness' developed by South African courts, fewer conflicting 
precedents under the South African law of torts than under the Australian 
tort of negligence. 
It is submitted that the court in Daniei.< v Anderson did not exclude the 
possibility that in future the liability of Australian company directors 
could still be based on the traditional, English-influenced, concep t of 
gross or culpable negligence determined by subjective clements. Also, the 
court did not hold that equitable remedies for a breach of directors' 
fiduciary duties will not be available to shareholders. However, the tort of 
negligence would be a much easier cause of action to rely on than the 
English-influenced common-law remedy for a breach of directors' duty 
of care, skill and diligence, based on the concept of gross or culpable 
negligence and detennined by subjective elements. Thus, it is highly 
probable that in future Australian companies will rely on the tort of 
negligence to sue their directors in breach of their duty of care if they 
choose to rely on non-statutory rClneciies. H owever, it is now well 
established that predominantly it is the statutory duties of Australian 
directors that are enforced nowadays, especially because of the dominant 
role the prim.ary corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Invest-
ments Commission (ASIC), plays in instituting action against directors for 
a breach of their statutol)' duties. 4i This brings us to a discussion of 
directors' duty of care and diligence in terms of the Australian Corpora-
tions Act 2001. 
:19 D Hutchinson 'AquiJian Liability f[ (Twentieth Century), in R Zimmermann and 0 
Visser (eds) SOIl/hem Cross: Ollil LAw Imd Common LoU! in SOlak AJn'ca (1996) 596 at 622 explains 
as follows: 'The most vociferous critic ofrhe duty concept was Pncc, who conducted a long and 
acrimonious camp;lign to rid our Jaw [the South African Law] of this ";IIi en and di$turbing" 
element. Echoing the view of Buckland. who considered the concept "an unnecessary fifth 
\vheel on the coach, incapable of sound analysis and possibly productive of injustice". Price 
argued that it was nOI only confusing and ambiguous but also tautologou~, in that it merely 
repeated the foreseeability test for fault .' 
40 See again op cit 636- 7 . 
41 See JJ du Plessis et tll Pri,wI'les r:fConlemporary Corporate Covert/arlee (2005) at 259-60. 
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Section 185 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides as 
follows: 
185 Interaction of sections 180 to 184 with other laws etc 
Sections 180 to 184: 
(aj h:wc effect in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rule of law 
relating to the duty or liability of a person because of their office or 
employment in relatlon to a corporation; and 
(b) do nOt prevent the commencement of civil proceedings for a breach of a 
duty or in respect of a liability referred to in paragraph (a). 
I th ink that the only safe thing to conclude from s 185 is that it clearly 
states that s 180(1) - directors' statutory duty of care and diligence - is not 
a codification of directors' duty of care and diligence. It is, however, far 
more difficult to detennine to what extent the common-law business 
judgment rule bas been codified. The difficulty arises from the wording of 
the concluding sentence ofs 185, reading as follows: 
This s<::crion (5 185) does l10t apply to subsections 180(2) and (3) to the extent 
to which tbey operate on the duties at common law and in equity that are 
equivalent to {he requirements of subsection \80(1). 
The Austtalian business judgment rule is contained in s 180(2) and (3). 
In other words, the concluding sentence in s 185 basically excludes the 
application oftbe main part of s 185 as far as the business judgment rule 
(s 180(2) and (3») is concerned. T he difficulty of comprehending the 
actual meaning of chis exclusion comes into sharp focus when it is realised 
(hat there are two separate qualifications contained in the concluding 
sentence of s 185 as far as tbe general application of the section is 
concerned. First, the concluding sentence of s 185 provides tbat s 185 
does not apply to s 180(2) and (3). However, the second qualification is 
that it only does not apply 'to the extent to which' the two subsections (sub-ss 
(2) and (3) of s 180, containing the business judgment rule) 'operate on 
the duties at common law and in equity'. The question begs, 'to which 
extent will the statutory business judgment rule not apply to directors' 
duties at COl11l11on law and in equity that are not equivalent to the 
requirements of[directors' statutory duty of care and diligence],? Would it 
be possible for a company to allege that a director, who otherwise could 
rely on the protection of the business judgment rule, cannot rely on its 
protection because the extent of the statutory duty- of care and diligence is 
\vider or narrower than this duty under the common la\v or in equity? 
Several of the Australian corporations law texts do not even mention 
s 185, while others simply refer to the main part of s 185, but not to the 
concluding sentence. There are only twO texts that could be found that 
deaJ \\lith the concluding sentence of s 185, but neither provides any clear 
explanation of the aims or scope of the sentence. Hincby and McDer-
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mott'O simply observe that '[sJection 185 further states that the section 
does not apply to s 180(2) and (3) to the extent to which they operate on 
the duties at common law and in equity that are equivalent to the 
requirements of s 180(1)'. In other words, simply repe"ting the wording 
of the concluding sentence, \vithout any further explanation or clarifica-
tion of what it 111eans. 
Austin, Ford and Ramsay only explain that's 185 provides that the 
operation of the business judgment rule enunciated in s 180(2) and (3) is 
n.ot confined to the statutory duty of care' (ernphasis added).~; NO[ only 
does this not refer to the qual ification, 'to the extent to which they [sub-s5 
(2) and (3) of s 180] operate on tbe duties at common law and in eguity 
that are equivalent to the requirclnents of s 180(1) [\vhich contai ns the 
statutory dury of care and diligence)'. but tbe authors' statement seems to 
be based on a llusinterpretation of the concluding sentence of s 185. It is 
after all stated very clearly in the 'Note ' to s 180(2) that the business 
judgment rule as contained in s 180(2) 
only operates in relation to duties under this section and their equivalent duties 
at common lav·.' or in equity (including the duty of care that arises under the 
common law principles governing liability for negligence)-it does not operate 
in relation to duties under any other provision orchis Act or under any other 
laws. 
That seems to indicate that the protection of the business judgment rule 
is indeed different from 'what Austin, Ford and Ramsay state, col!fincd to 
protection against a breach of directors' statutory duty of care and 
diligence and any duty comparable to that statutory duty." 
It Inay therefore be concluded that the concluding sentence of s 185 is 
so ambiguous and so uncertain in its object and interpretation as to be 
virtually meaningless. It is difficult to see the sentence having a use within 
this provision without careful redrafting. 
(c) Devclopme/lt and rifrnemenr of dil'ectol~~ I stalL/ tory dut), C!f care and dil(qencc in 
Australia 
It is remarkable to note that the predecessor of the current ' 180(1) 
(directors' du ty of carc and diligence) \vas already incorporated in the 
so R Hinchy and P McDermott Compan)' Law 2 cd (2006) 165. 
3i RP Austill et 21 Comptltl)' Dirccror,c Principle! of Law and COIporalc COIJrnlllll(t (200S) 683 
par(! 18.6, The matter is not taken <lily further in Austin and Rams;'!)" (n 21) paras 3.355. 9.288 
and 20.150 where there are references to s 185. 
.'>, The part included in this note, including 'the duty of care th?! ari$e~ under the common 
law principics governing liability for negligence', i.~ dearly an :lttcmpt to ensure that the b\lSUle!i~ 
Judgment rule may in principle :Jlso be available to directors if~ucd under the tOrt of negl igence 
explained in Danids 11 /l/1dcrsoll, in contr;lSt with ::be more traditlomJ common-law duty of care, 
skill and diligence developed primarily by older English cases as expl<lined above, 
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(2) Directors' .lIatutory duty of care and diligence 
(aJ H istoric context 
T here were times in Aw;tralia where great trust and confidence were 
expressed in Australian company directots - almost a complacency. As Sir 
Douglas Menzies put it so eloquently in 1959: 
[I] am quite certain thac we all, with our modest acquaintanceship with 
companies and their sharcs(.) believe that most companies in Australia - and, 
indeed, I should think, practically without exception, the big well managed 
companies of Australia - arc m;,naged not onJy in strict conformjty with the 
law but with the very highest degree of integrity and imagination.42 
This stands in stark contrast with Robert Baxt's opening sentence in a 
contribution published in 1989 when he was the Chair of the T rade 
Practices Commission: 
The recent spate of company crashes (the names of some of the most 
important companies in Australia liner the daily newspapers) have put added 
pressure on the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs which is cu rrently examining the social and fi duciary responsibilit ies of 
direccors.4 ) 
In the SaJlle contribution Baxt also observes that it was interesting to 
notice a 'groundswell of opinion developing that perhaps not all [was] 
well with the current [1989] law in its control of directors, auditors and 
others'." In 1991, R edmond used strong words to condemn what was 
gomgon: 
The delinquency of those who abuse the stewardship of other people 's money 
is a species of deviance which .is arguably as socially corrosive as the street 
offences which preoccupy the c riminal justice system. 4S 
It was indeed a rude av.rakening when it was realised that, especially 
during the 1980$, there were in actual fact several so- called 'corporate 
cowboys' behind the wheels of several important Australian public 
companies. There is probably no quicker and better way for the unin-
formed to get a grasp of what happened in Australia during the 19805 than 
to read Trevor Syke's excellen t book, The Bold Riders: Behind Australia 's 
.:1 Menzies (n .35) 174, in his reply to co mments made about his address. 
.;} R Baxt 'The Role of Company Directors' (1989) 17 Australia Busitless Law Review 275 ,n 
275. 
44 Ibid 277. 
.,~ Redmond (n 13) 87. 
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Corporate Collapses,'" describing in considerable detail how certain indi-
viduals abused the corporate [01111 and caused significant suffering to 
ordinary (Mom and Dad' investors in Australia.4i As poi nted out else-
where, having some knowledge of the excesses of the 1980s is indeed 
essential to understand and explain many of the statut0ty provisions in (he 
Austtalian Corporations Act 2001. 48 
(b) Has directors' duty ~r care and diligence been codtfied·w completely in ..r1usfI·alia? 
It is quite important to consider this question, as it determines \...,hether 
the giant step taken by Daniels j) Andersoll as far as directors' duty of care 
and diligence is concerned has any practical application. Section 180(1) of 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides as [0110,\75: 
180 Care and diligence - civil obligation only 
Care and diligence - directors and other officers 
(1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers 
and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a 
reasonable person \-vould exercise if they: 
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation's cirj::um-
stances; and 
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the 
corporation as, the direccor or officer. 
Note: This subsection is. a civil penalty provision (sec section 1317E). 
46 T Syke The Bold Rider.~: Bchif1.d Australias Corporate Collap.lcs 2 ed (1996). 1 <lin thankful that 
my good friend, Gregory Lyon (sq. gave me a copy of this book on my s(.:cond visit to 
Australia in 1998 as the book not only helped me to understand the Australian corpor:ttiom law 
better, but also stimulated in me a deep interest in the Australian eorporati om law. 
,;7 It is interesting to note th:l.t the proportion of Aumaliam owning sharc~ has alway~ 
been one ofche highest in the ,vodd - 53,7% (:approximately 7,411lillion), of the population-
see M Duffy 'Shareholder Represent ... tive Proceedings: RemedIes for the Mums and the Dads' 
2001 (August) LAw Society Joun1a/53; A Ca.meron'The Effect ofHa.nnoni~atiOi"! on the Reguia-
tor and Regulation ', Address to the Economic Development of Australi<l (CED:\') Seminar. 
Sydney, 11 February 2000. <Imp: / /wa}w.'"i.\il.gov.all /Q$;c /tt$i{.II.~f/b)'h(·ad;:'lc/Thc "" 
tjJell+q/+hamlOllisafit)fl+OIl +lhc+ll.'gull1tor+alld+rcgllia:;il//>: 1 Ramsay 'Sp('!ci ;"l \ FI.::;t\ln:: Leg.;"!l 
and Reform Issucs in the Regl.lb.tioll ofFin<l nci.1i :znd Capit:!l Markel):' (200 I) S Singapo fejounliii 
oj il1lcmalionai alld Comparalil1c UU.f 485 at 487. 
48 JJ du Plessis 'Revcrbentioas after the HI H and other Recent Australian CorporJ.~e 
Collapses: T he R.o\c of ASIC' (2003) 15 AIIs(ra[ianJomnaI4Corporate L..1!./1225:1,( 227. 
-<9 Under 'Codification', f mean that it is only the statutory provision that will ~pp!y and chat 
the 'general l::Iw' (defined in tcrms of s 9 of the Aumalian Corpof3tiom Act 2001, a~ 'the 
principles and rules of the common law and equity' ) will no longer apply. An example of 
'Codification' under the Australi.m Corporations Act 2001, is the rule in Foss v Harbollir (1983) 
2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 - s 236 of the Act deals "\v1t11 the issue oflw .. " proceeding arc brought on 
behal f of a company and how companies can intervene in proceedings. Section 236(3) provides 
a clear example o f codifi c:ltion of this area, b-y providing that 'It1hc right of a person at general 
Inv (see again definition above) to bring, or intervene in, proceedings on behaif ofa company 1.< 
abolished' (emph asis. added). In other words, the rule in Fass [! [-{(IrbOlrlr: ha.s no place in Australian 
corporations law any longer - the law h;l.$ been codified! 
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Victorian Con1panies Act in 1958 and in Tasnlanian lavv' in 1959.53 It is 
surely true that at that stage there \.vas no equivalent statutory provision in 
any other legislation relating to companies in the English-speaking 
worldJi4 
Section 107 of the Victorian Companies Act 1958 provided as follows: 
107(1) A director shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence 
in the discharge of the duties of his office. 
(2) Any officer of a company shall not make use of any information acquired 
by virtue ofhi5 posicion as an officer to gain ~an improper advantage for himself 
or to cause detriment to the company. 
(3) Any officer who cOll1mirs a breach of the foregoing provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of an ofience against this Act and shall be liable to a 
penalty of not more than Five hundred pounds and ~hall in addition be liable 
to the company for any profIt made by him or for any damage suffered by the 
company as a result of the breach of any such provision. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice the operation of any other 
enactment or n.llc oflaw relating to the duty or liability of directors or officers 
of a company. 
This provision became s 124 of the Australian Uniform Companies Act 
1961, with only one significant addition. Instead of referring only to 'gain 
an improper advantage' in s 107(1), s 124(1) added 'directly or indirectly' 
_ 'gain directly or indirectly an improper advantage' .55 Section 124(4) was 
drafted more elegantly, to read as follows: 
124(4) This section is in addition to and not in derogation of any other 
enactment or rule oflaw relating to the duty or liabilit;.' of directors or officers 
of a company. 
It will be noticed that s 124(4) reflects what is currently contained in 
s 185(a) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, but without any 
qualifications and in a much 1110re direct and straightforv.;ard way. 
The general excitenlent of having introduced some specific statutory 
duties, that created the impression of setting objective standard for 
directorsS6 long before any other English-speaking country did so, was 
short-lived because of a particular interpretation of the statutory duty of 
53 Cooney Report (n 31 ) 24 p:ml 3. 15. 
~ " Daniels II Andersol1 (0 6) :It 660. 
~~ Redmond (0 13) 102- 3 points out that the first expomre draft of this Jegi~lation 
introduced a more vigorous duty, expecting or directors '(l dtgrec of carc, diligence and ~kill 
that is not le$s than the degree of care, diligence ,md skill that a r~asonablc prudent person would 
t.:xcrcise to his own busim:ss or affairs in compar.lblc circulllstancc~', but 'the article attracted 
enormous criticism (particularly of senior management) fot extracting an impo~sible standard or 
one that was inappropriate to :I body obliged to act collectively (at 103)'. 
% See gcnerally as to the intention to introduce objective standards, J H Farrar 'Report on 
Modcrni~ingAustral!:ln C<Hporation L"lw' (1992) August BIl~il1ess COl/neil Bulletil113 at 16. 
.. ""'T". 
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'reasonable diligence' contained in s 107(1) of the Victorian Companies 
Act 1958 by the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court in the case of 
Byrne" Bake<S7 As s 107(1) of the Victorian Companies Act 1958 and 
s 124(1) of the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 were virtually 
identical, the critique of Byrne v Baker applied generally to the law in place 
at that stage. It should be noted that Byrne v Baker actually dealt with the 
injustices caused by the fact that several charges were made against the 
respondent for breaching a single statutory provision, ie s 107(1) . The 
respondent argued that only one offence could be committed ifin breach 
ofs 107(1). A major part of the case, which was probably the ratio, deals 
with the meaning of the part 'at all times act honestly· and use reasonable 
diligence' in s 107(1). Did that require 'reasonable diligence' 'at all times' 
or only to act 'honestll at 'at all times'? It was because of these points that 
the court rejected the argU111cnt that there ·were several offences Jnd spent 
guite a bit off time to show the injustices toward the defendant fto\ving 
from the fact that the charges \\'cre drafted erroneously. ;i8 However, the 
court. in trying to establish v.,hat standards were expected of a director 
under s 107(1), as an obiter in my view, interpreted s 107(1) in cOntext of 
the City Equitable Fire Insurance case. In other words, the court interpreted 
the statutory provision do\vn to the lower casc~Iav.1 standards. 
As part of its observations in passing, the court noted that the omission 
of'skills' in s 107(1) was significant and concluded that in fact '[w]hat the 
legislature by the sub-section is demanding of honest directors is diligence 
only; and the degree of diligence demanded is vlhat is reasonable in the 
circumstances and no tuore ' . 59 This obviously caused considerable con-
cern an10ng legislators and commentators as it \-vas surely not intended by 
the legislature to lower the already low standards of care, skill and 
diligence expected of directors under the English-influenced common 
law.60 
Section 124 of the Australlan Uniform Companies Act 1961 6i was later 
taken up in s 229 of the Companies Act 1981 (Cth)62 The original 
provision (s 107 of the VictOrian Companies Act 1958 and s 124 of the 
Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961) was split into two different 
subsections, namely s 229(1) and (2): 
" /1964J VR. 443. 
58 BYYIIC'!I Baker at 452 (bottom or pag~) (Of seq. 
:>'J Byrne v Bak~r at 450. 
(.0 See Cooney Report (n 31) 25 para 3.19. 
61 T he Uniform Companies Act of 1961 \Va~ ha~cd on the VIctorian !cg;~!atlon - ~ce J C2s~idy 
Corpora,io"s Law: Texl and EssCltlial Cmcs 2 cd (2008) 4. 
62 See Cassidy (n 61) 4 for an explanation h()w thl" Companies An 1981 (C lh) ;!.pplicd and 
how it wa~ adopted by each ~ute . See http://www.austlii.edu.auhu/legivcth/num ... ac t/ 
ca 1981107 Is1.htll11 (or the CompaOlcs Act 89 of 1981 (ACT), which applied in the Australian 
Ca.pital Territory. 
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229. (1) An officer of a corporation shall at all times act honestly in the exercise 
of his powers and the discharge of the duties ofhj$ office. 
Pcnalty-
(a) in a case to which paragraph (b) does not apply - S5,000; or 
(b) where the offence was committed with intent to deceive or defraud the 
company, members Ot creditors of the company or creditors of any other 
person or for any other fraudulent purpose - S20,OOO or imprisonment 
for 5 years, or both. 
(2) An officer of a corporation shall at all times exercise a reasonable degree 
of care and diligence in the exercise of his powers and the discharge of his 
duties. 
Penalty: $5,000. 
It will be noted that it was now made a criminal offence if the breach of 
s 229(1) met the requirements set out in s 229(1)(h) - 'where the offence 
was con1mitted w ith intent to deceive or defraud the company, m embers 
or creditOrs of the company or creditors of any other person or for any 
other fraudulent purpose'. Because of Byrne v Baker, the new statutory 
provision introduced an expanded objective standard by replacing the 
wording 'reasonable diligence' with 'a reasonable degree of care and 
diligence' in s 229(4)63 It is interesting to note that the comments in Byrne 
v Baker regarding the omission of 'skills' were apparently not taken on 
board by the legislature in enacting s 229(4) of the Australian Companies 
Act 1981. These provisions were then taken up in s 232(2) to (4) of the 
Corporations Act 1989 (Cth): 
232(2) An officer of a relevant body corporate shall at all times act honestly in 
the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of the duties of his or her 
office. 
(3) The penalty applicable to a contravention of subsection (2) is: 
(a) jfthe contravention was committed wish intent to deceive or defraud the 
company, members or creditO rs of the company or creditors of any other 
person or for any other fraudulent purpose - 520,000 or imprisonment 
for 5 years , or both; or 
(b) otherwise - $5,000. 
(4) An officer of a relevant body corporate shall at all times exercise a 
reasonable degree of care and diligence in the exercise of his or her powers and 
the discharge of his or her duties. 
Again, in terms of s 229(11 ), s 229 had 'effect in addition to, and not in 
derogation of, any rule oflaw relating to the duty or liability of a person 
by reason of his offIce or employment in relation to a corporation and 
does not prevent the institution of any civil proceedings in respect of a 
breach of such a duty or in respect of such a liability' . 
G.' See Cooney Report (n 31) 2S para 3.19. 
.., 
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At the end of1989 the influential Cooney Report was released64 This 
contained some specific recommendations on directors' duty of care and 
diligence in chapter 3. In analysing the case law and how directors' duty of 
care and diligence was perceived at that stage, it was concluded that the 
standards expected of directors in the past did not match the standards the 
community expects of modern company directors.6s The Cooney 
Report made ·a firm recommendation that 'an objective duty of care for 
directors be provided in th e companies legislation'66 It also made a 
definite recommendation that a 'business j udgment rul e be introduced 
into Australian company law' . It was said that such a rule 
should include an obligation on directors to inform themselves of matters 
relevant to the administration of the company. They should be required to 
exercise an active discretion in the relevant matter or, alternatively, to show a 
reaso nable degree of care in the circumstances .67 
Some of the other recommendations of the Cooney Report included 
that 'directors be required to attend board meetings unless there is a 
reasonable excuse to non-attendance';68 that provisions should be 
included in company legislation to discourage the appointment of 'fig-
urehead directors';69 and that 'the companies legislation be amended to 
provide for, and specifically limit, the extent to which company offIcers 
may rely on others'7o 
In response to the Cooney R eport, s 232(4) was amended in an 
attempt to ensure a more objective approach to directors' duty of care and 
diligence. This was done in 1992 by way of s 11 of the Corporate Law 
R eformAct 1992, amending s 232(4) as follows:71 
232(4) In the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of his or her 
duties, an officer of a corporation must exercise the degree of care and 
diligence that a reasonable person in a like position in a corporation would 
exercise in the corporation's circumstances. 
First and foremost, it should be noted that, different from the recom-
mendation of the Cooney Report, no business judgment rule was 
included as part of the amended s 232(4)72 Secondly, the Exposure Draft 
64 Cooney Report (n 31). See generally on the Cooney Report, R Baxt 'Rcfonning the Law 
Relating to Company Directors' (1990) 64 Australian Law JOllma1345. 
6S Cooney Report (n 31) 19 para 3.2, 22 para 3.9, 28, p<lr .. 3.24. See also J Dodds (n 31) 136. 
6(, Cooney R eport (n 31) 29 para: 3.28. 
67 Op cit 31 para 3.35. 
68 Op cit 32 para 3.39. 
69 Op cit d 33 paras 3.41 and 3.42. 
70 Op cit 36 para 3.53. 
71 See also Explanatory Memorandum to Corporate Law Refom1 Act 1992. 
7l Sec generally R edmond (n 13) 89 and 111 et seq. 
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that followed the Cooney recommendations listed a number of factors 
relevant to the determination of the appropriate standard of care and 
diligence. These factors were intended not merely as a guide for the 
courts, but also to guide the directors as to factors and matters relevant in 
the perfornnl1ce of their dutiesJ3 It is also significant to note that at the 
same time this section was decriminalised! A breach was now only 
considered to be a breach of a civil penalty provision. Another significant 
change was that the words 'a reasonable degree of care and diligence' was 
replaced with the more objective approach of 'the degree of care and 
diligence that a reasonable person would ... .'. Also, the review of a 
breach of directors' standard of care and diligence now were to be judged 
comparing the action of the director who is alleged to be in breach of his 
or her duty of care and diligence with a person 'in a like position in a 
corporation' and how that person 'would exercise his or her powers and 
the discharge his or her duties 'in the corporation's circumstances'. It 
should be remembered, as the Cooney Report so appropriately pointed 
out, that: 
[t]here is no objective common law standard of the reasonably competent 
company director, as there are objective standards for other professions. It is 
not an easy task to determine uniform minimum standards of behaviour for 
company directors. The activities of companies are diverse and consequently a 
range of skills and experience is useful on boards, but, if the modern company 
director wants professional status, then professional standards of care ought to 
apply." 
and 
It may be easy to require directors oflarge public companies to show higher 
standards in their duty of care than directors of the small proprietary company, 
but what is required will inevitably be affected by the particular circumstances 
- the size, structure and sphere of operation of the company, the composition 
of the board and the distribution of responsibility among board members, for 
example.7 :> 
The most significant change effected when the duty of care and 
diligence was taken up in the Australian Corporations Law (now the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001) as s 180, was the introduction of the 
'business judgment rule' in s 180(2). Section 180(1), dealing with the duty 
of care and diligence as such, was reformatted and reformulated sligbtly, 
but no substantive changes were made as would be apparent - see s 180 of 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 quoted above. 
7" Redmond 103-4. 
74 Cooney Report (n 31) 28 para 3.25. 
75 Op cit 28 para 3.27. 
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IV SOME COMPARISONS AND SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The South African and Australian lav .. r regarding directors' duty of care, 
skill and diligence were both influenced considerably by English prece-
dents of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Tbis meant that for almost a 100 
years there were very little difference hov./ these duties \:vere perceived in 
the two jurisdictions. Although Australia was far ahead of South Africa in 
expressing the duty of diligence in legislation (s 107 of the Victorian 
Companies Act 1958), the way the courts interpreted this statutory duty 
in Byrne v Baker revealed that the statutory duty of diligence lowered the 
standards of care expected of directors even further. That was, of course, a 
totally unintended result. However, even in 1992, with Roger C]'s 
decision in A WA v Daniels, it seems as if the standards of care and diligence 
expected of at least non-executive directors under the Australian com-
mon law were still remarkably lo\ov. It is interesting to note that it was 
almost exactly at the same time that the Cooney Report (1989) promoted 
more objective standards of care for directors, and \vhen Parliament 
introduced more objective statutory standards of care and diligence (s 
232(4) of the Corporations Law as amended by s 11 of the Corporate Law 
Reform Act 1992), that the rather conservative decision of Rogers C] was 
handed down. 
Also in South Africa the courts adopted a conservative approach 
towards directors' duty of care, skill and diligence. Fisheries Development 
Corporation, even though decided in 1980, is still today the leading South 
African case on directors' common-law duty of care, skill and diligence. 
Fisheries Development CO/poration is still the leading South African case on 
directors' common-law duty of care, skill and diligence, even though, on 
a particular issue like the distinction between the duties of executive and 
non-executive directors, it \\'as in effect overruled in a case like Howard v 
Herrigel. 76 
As stated before, Daniels v Anderson represents the pinnacle in Australia 
(and probably also in other jurisdictions influenced by English law') of the 
development of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence, that only 
started to emerge in greater detail in about 1869 with tbe case of Turquand 
v Marshall, Daniels v Anderson was decided in 1995 and since then it can 
safely be stated that the standards of care expected of Australian directors 
under the common law raised considerably ~ Daniels v Anderson brought 
an abrupt end to the notions that directors' duty of care, skill and diligence 
should be judged subjectively and that their negligence 'must be in a 
business sense culpable or gross'. Although Daniels v Anderson represents 
the pinnacle of developments in this regards, there were at least two 
earlier cases that caused a \vake-up call for sleeping or dormant directors 
" 1991 (2) SA 660 (AD) at 678A. 
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in Australia77 - the cases of Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v lvforley78 and 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich79 
Although no South African court had the opportunity in recent times 
to revisit the basis ofliability of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence, 
there is no dispute in South Africa that the basis ofliability for a breach of 
directors' duty of care, skill and diligence is an extension of Aquilian 
liability (liability under the lex Aquilia) 80 Because of this, it is not hard to 
predict that, if the opportunity should arise for a South African court to 
consider whether a director is in breach ofhi5 common-law duty of care, 
skill and diligence, the form of fault that would be required would be 
negligence as judged against the standards of the reasonable person. In 
detennining whether such a director acted wrongfully, the court would 
use the well-accepted standards of the legal conviction of the community 
(boni mores). Thus, although the English law 'duty of care' doctrine has 
been rejected by South African courts and by South African academics, it 
is submitted that equally high standards of care, skill and diligence are in 
actual fact expected of South African directors. In this sense, the dangers 
for South African cOlnpany directors are more concealed because of the 
lack of cases, but that the dangers are there cannot be denied - using an 
African analogy, it could be said that one should never think that there is 
no danger in the bush if one cannot see the leopard in the bush simply 
because the leopard can camouflage itself better than probably any other 
dangerous predator! 
Australia was indeed far ahead of any English-speaking jurisdiction 
expressing directors' duty of diligence in a statutory provision as early as 
1958. As Inentioned, however, the case of Byrne v Baker caused a rude 
awakening when the original statutory provision was interpreted as 
having lowered the standards of diligence expected of directors. This was 
soon rectified by the introduction of the phrase 'reasonable degree of care 
and diligence', replacing the previous formulation' of 'reasonable dili-
gence' (s 229(2) of the Companies Act 1981 (Cth). Since then, the 
Australian legislature has been detenllined to objectifY the statutory 
standards of care expected of directors. This was achieved by amending 
s 232(4) of the Corporations Law in 1992 (s 11 of the Corporate Law 
77 See JJ du Plessis 'Wanopvattings oor die Aanspreeklikhcid van Nie-uitvoerende Direk-
tcure' 1994 TSAR 137; Hill (n 29) 504. 
"(1990) 8ACLC827. 
79 (1991) 9 ACLC 946. See generally AS Sievers 'Faw .. vell to the Sleeping Director - The 
Modern Judicial and Lcgislativc Approach to Directors' Duties of Carc, Skill and Diligcncc' 
(1993) 21 Australian Business Law Review 111. 
~() Benson v De Beers Cons()/idaled Mines Ltd 198B (1) 834 (NC) at 836; Ex parte Lebowa 
Developmcnl Corporation Lid 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) at 106; Du Plessis II Phelps 1995 (4) S.I\ 165 (C) at 
170C. 
"-r 
DlRECTORS' DUTY OF CARE, SKILL AND DILIGENCE 287 
Reform Act 1992). Section 180(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 currently contains the objectified statutory duty of care and dili-
gence. 
In South Africa there has never been any attempt to express directors' 
duties in general company la\v legislation. Hov"lever, s 43 of the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984 could be seen as a good expression, in 
legislation, of how directors' duty of care, skill and diligence was per-
ceived in South Africa. 
A comparison bem'een s 180(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 and s 76(3) reveals a number of interesting aspects. First, the word 
'skill' has been retained in s 76(3), \vhile there has never been any 'duty of 
skill' required of directors in tem1S of any predecessor of s 180(1) of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. Secondly, s 76(3) of the Act explicitly 
retained subjective elements - 'having the general kno"\vledge, skill and 
experience of that director'. Is this a bad thing' 
As pointed out in the discussion above, the aim of the South African 
legislature with s 76(3) (c) is to ensure that apples are compared with 
apples. I have consistently argued, as a n1ember of the International 
Reference Group assisting the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry in Corporate Law Reform since 2004, that I favour the objective 
approach of s 180(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. There is, 
however, one very strong argument that nude me realise that a require-
ment such as 'having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that 
director' is not in fact inappropriate in the context of the current South 
African situation. 
Although massive progress has been made, the skills pool in South 
Africa is probably still too limited to carry the country's vision for its 
economic and social development as well as achieving the high aims \"-'ith 
the new South African Companies Act 71 of2008 listed in s 7 of that Act! 
If the standards expected of all directors are too high, they will act as a 
barrier to people from all walks oflife in South Africa accepting director-
ships. Less experienced persons \\1il1 be less prepared to take up a position 
where their conduct will be evaluated as if they are experienced and 
knowledgeable. This reluctance will limit the number of companies in 
South Africa and \vill impact on its economic and social development. It 
is, therefore, ilTIportant for any company law model to strike the right 
balance between accountability and freedom of actionS1 or, as it has also 
been described, finding 'sufficient inducement in order to facilitate the 
81 LS Sealy 'Directors' Duties - Striking the Right Balance bctv.'ccn Accountability and 
Freedom of Action'. Paper presented to the Ninth Commonweaith La\ .... Conference (Aprij 
1990) referred to by S Sievers 'Directors' Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence-Further Develop-
ments' (1992) 10 Company and Sccurilies LawJoumal337 <It 341; and by the Honorouble Andrew 
Rogers 'The Slow Boat to Proper Corporate Governance' Clayton VIZ Addresses: http:// 
\\n, .. /v;.claytonutt.com/downloads/Rogers.pdf at 1. 
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entrepreneurial risk-taking and innovations that are so essential to eco-
nomic well-being'. 82 
Not surprisingly, the fear is often raised by directors, and those 
lobbying for directors, that too-stringent liability would make directors 
flock away from boards - this is not a new phenomenon, but 'surpris-
ingly', over the centuries there has not been a lack of people taking up 
directorships regardless of a considerable increase in the potential of 
directors to be held personally liable or to be convicted of numerous new 
statutory criminal offences created by legislatures all over the world. 
Whether the fear for personal liability (civil or criminal) is real or only 
perceived is often debated.83 The matter has also been raised in the public 
debates around the new South African Companies Act 2008 and it seems 
fair to say that there is some evidence that this fear exists in South Africa, 
although its full extent may be difficult to determine. 
If the retention of the subjective elements assists in the fashioning of a 
test for the breach of the duty of care and skill that is fair to both highly 
experienced and knowledgeable directors as well as those who are less so, 
South Africa will have a balanced and accessible framework for the duty of 
care and skill. It is submitted that this objective is achievable, depending 
on the interpretation of the statutory test in s 76(3). 
I argued above that s 76(3) introduces a two-step approach: The court 
will first have to determine what the degree of care, skill and diligence is 
that may reasonably be expected of a director 'carrying out the same 
functions in relation to the company as those carried out by that director 
(director whose conduct is scrutinised)' (s 76(3)(c)(i)). Secondly, the court 
will also have to make a value judgment as to the degree of care, skill and 
experience that can be expected from such a director, with 'the general 
knowledge, skill and experience of that director (director whose conduct 
is scrutinised), (s 76(3) (c)(ii)). 
If the courts emphasise the second part of this tesnhey can ensure that 
directors with nl0re 'general knowledge', more 'skill' and more 'experi-
ence' are judged objectively against the standards set by directors with 
similar 'general knowledge, skills and experience'. And, in similar vein, 
that directors with less 'general knowledge', less 'skill' and less 'experi-
ence' are judged objectively against the standards set by directors with 
similar 'general knowledge, skill and experience'. There seems to be a lot 
of merit in doing so in the South African context. 
Apart from many other reasons given why 'low standards' were in fact 
32 MI Steinberg 'The Corporate Law Reform Act 1992: A Vicv,,- from Abroad' (1993) 3 
Australian Jou.rnal ojCorporate Law 153 at 164. 
83 See Review Sanctions in Corporations Act (5 March 2007): http://www.treasury.gov.au/ 
contentitem.asp?Navld=&ContentID=1182; and Survey of Company Directors (December 
2008): http://wv.rw.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?Nav Id=037 &ContentID=1387. 
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expected of directors by the English courts in the late 1800s and early 
1990s, the thought of how daunting it is to manage and direct companies 
(especially large public companies), must often have crossed the minds of 
the English Law Lords. Probably, when they also realised that the 
knowledge, skills and experience of ordinary citizens were required to 
ensure that rubber companies, shipping companies, railway con1panies, 
electricity companies, companies established for the public good (,water 
works, gas works, roads, bridges, markets, piers, baths, wash houses, 
workmen's lodge houses, reading rooms, clubs . _. ')84 are managed 
properly, it must have crossed the minds of their Lordships that if the 
standard of care, skill and diligence is set too high and, if these ordinary 
citizens could be held liable too easily, nobody (especially not ordinary 
citizens!) would take up positions as company directors. Similar argu-
ments now seem to me to provide very goodjustiflcation, atleast for the 
moment, for defending s 76(3) of the Act in its entirety! 
84 See JJ du Plessis 'Corporate La\\' and Corporate Governance Lessons from the Past: Ebbs 
and Flows, but far from "The End of History. : Part 2'" (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 70 at 
71-2. 
